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1 Introduction 
It is a common practice for governments to offer scrappage subsidies in order to 
stimulate the early voluntary removal of used cars and modify the distribution of 
vehicle holdings. 1 Typically, such subsidies are temporary and are offered in ex-
change for used cars of delineated vintages, which are characteristically more pol-
luting.2 Nonetheless, since scrappage subsidies interfere with the workings of car 
markets, their implications are not confined to the environmental impact. In this 
paper, we analyze the market implications of scrappage subsidies when producers 
have market power and face competition from a secondary used car market. 
There is little data and analysis identifying how scrappage subsidies affect car 
markets. In Canada and the United States, a few geographically-localized subsidies 
have been implemented, and most of the analysis has focused on measuring the ef-
fects on emission reduction. 3 Nonetheless, the possibility that such programs will 
be expanded has evoked a debate surrounding their effects on car markets: some 
argue that they would jeopardize the auto-parts industry, benefit automobile manu-
facturers , and harm low income consumers by removing inexpensive cars from the 
marketplace. 4 
In the European Union, scrappage subsidies were very popular during the 1990s. 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, most of them countries with es-
tablished automobile manufacturing industries, offered subsidies that required pur-
chasing a new vehicle as a replacement. Instead , Denmark and Norway (and also 
the United States and Canada) offered subsidies without any constraints. 
A common pattern that arises from the data is an increase in the volume of 
sales of new cars. For instance, European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
(1999) documents the cases of France and Italy, and Data Resources Inc./McGraw-
Hill (1991) identifies the increase in sales as a likely consequence of implementing 
scrappage subsidies in the United States. Another observed pattern that is partic-
ularly important for the arguments advanced in this paper is the one documented 
for Denmark. European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1999) reports that, 
during the first six months of the subsidy, 6% of the Danish car fleet was scrapped. 
Among participants, 11% bought a new car, 45% bought a used one, and 44% did 
1 Scrappage subsidies are also known as buy-back programs or accelerated vehicle retirement 
programs. 
2See Kahn (1996) for a study of vehicle emissjon trends across model years, makes, and sizes. 
3See Hahn (1995), EPA (1998), and European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1999) for 
a comprehensive description of the different scrappage subsidy programs in the United States and 
Europe. 
4There has been opposition to scrappage subsidies because of their distributional effects. Other 
government policies, like taxes on gas, miles, or e!llgine size, or subsidies to new cars, have distribu-
tional implications as well, as discussed in West (2004). 
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not replace the scrapped vehicle. Thus, although the volume of new car sales in-
creased, most transactions took place in the secondary market. These observations 
suggest that accounting for an active secondary market might be critical for study-
ing scrappage subsidies. Supporting this conjecture, the report also documents that, 
in a typical year, only 10% of the Danish consumers who own a car which is ten 
years or older replace it with a new one. 
A useful benchmark for the analysis of scrappage subsidies is a replacement de-
mand model with a competitive primary market. Adda and Cooper (2000) use such 
a model to characterize the effects of scrappage subsidies and tax credits in France, 
where the subsidy was tied to the replacement vehicle being new.5 In a replace-
ment model, consumers buy a new car, keep it until they scrap it, and then return 
to the primary market to buy its replacement. Since the secondary market is never 
active, the subsidy works by advancing the time of car replacement, which creates 
a rapid and sharp increase in the sales of new cars. This replacement pattern would 
be consistent with subsidies that are tied to the purchase of a new vehicle, such as 
the cases of France and Spain, since they provide clear incentives to return to the 
primary market. Nonetheless, the trading pattern would diverge from the replace-
ment decisions in Denmark, where the subsidy was offered without constraints (as 
it was also the case in Canada, Norway, and the United States). 
In this paper, we examine the effects on car markets of an unconstrained scrap-
page subsidy in an environment with market power and active secondary markets. 
We focus on a monopolist that sells new cars and competes with a competitive sec-
ondary market in which used cars are transacted. Consumers are heterogeneous in 
their valuations of cars, and thus the secondary market also plays an allocative role. 
The government seeks to induce scrappage by offering a subsidy to those who 
scrap a used car. Since scrappage is an alternative to selling in the secondary market, 
the subsidy constitutes a price floor in the used car market. However, whether 
the price floor binds- whether the subsidy is effective- depends on the payment 
offered, the number of used cars in the marketplace, and the choice of production 
by the firm. For instance, if the firm's response was to increase production, the price 
in the primary market would decrease and this would induce additional scrappage. 
In understanding the implications of scrappage subsidies, a natural question to 
address is how low a subsidy should be to induce scrappage. An obvious candidate 
is to offer the price of the used car in the absence of the subsidy (i.e., pay the 
without-subsidy price). However, as we will see, we can offer less than this subsidy 
and still induce scrappage. 
Take as a benchmark the problem of the firm choosing its level of output when 
5Licandro and Sampayo (2004) also use a replacement demand model to analyze the effects of 
scrappage subsidies in Spain. 
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the subsidy is not offered. The substitutability in consumption between new and 
used cars implies that, if the firm increases production, prices in the secondary mar-
ket decrease. This decrease also lowers the willingness to pay for new cars and their 
prices, since the price of the alternative- the price of a used car- has decreased. 
Thus, through the secondary market, the firm creates a negative externality on itself 
when it increases output as it further reduces the new car price. 
Suppose, instead, there is a subsidy that pays the without-subsidy price for a 
used car. Obviously, since the subsidy matches the used car price, a feasible choice 
for the firm is to keep the price and profit unchanged by simply producing the 
without-subsidy output. However, the firm can do better. The subsidy is a price 
floor in the secondary market that truncates the dependence of new car prices on 
new car production through the secondary market. Consequently, the subsidy sup-
presses the negative externality that the monopolist creates on itself and makes an 
increase in production profitable for the firm. Then, since the without-subsidy profit 
level remains feasible by producing the without-subsidy output, simple revealed 
preference arguments tell us that the subsidy making the firm indifferent must pay 
less for a used car than its without-subsidy price. 
What drives this result is the market power of the firm and the heterogeneity 
of consumers. Without market power, a subsidy induces scrappage only if it offers 
(strictly) more for a used car than its without-subsidy price. To see this, consider the 
consumer who, without a subsidy, would be indifferent between purchasing a used 
car and not purchasing one. By definition, the indifferent consumer pays his full 
willingness to pay for the car, while the remaining buyers derive strictly positive 
utility from their purchases. Now suppose the subsidy equals the without-subsidy 
price of a used car. Since the primary market is competitive, the subsidy does not 
modify prices. Since all consumers- but the marginal one- value the used car 
more than the subsidy, they continue to purchase from the secondary market and 
their cars are not scrapped. Only the marginal consumer would be indifferent to 
scrapping his car, but this consumer has measure zero. Thus, to induce scrappage, 
the subsidy must pay (strictly) more for a used car than its without-subsidy price. 
Our model generates a number of implications for transactions and prices in 
the primary and secondary markets. If the subsidy pays less for a used car that its 
without-subsidy price, the subsidy lowers prices in the secondary market and in-
creases the fleet of cars. Otherwise, if it pays more than this price, used car prices 
increase and the car fleet decreases. We also provide a characterization of the wel-
fare effects of scrappage subsidies and show that aggregate welfare is maximized 
if the subsidy equals the lowest effective subsidy. That is to say, if the subsidy was 
welfare maximizing, prices in the secondary used car market would decrease. 
Despite being able to capture many aspects of car markets, our model is quite 
parsimonious: it is static, there is a single firm in the primary market, and the car 
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vintages are only new and used. These assumptions provide us with tractability and 
engender no loss of generality since our main result is robust to the additions of 
dynamics, imperfect competition, and multiple vintages. In Section 4, we study the 
three generalizations and show that the lowest effective subsidy is always less than 
the without-subsidy price of a used car. 6 
Our focus on car markets leads us to abstract away from modeling and evaluat-
ing the environmental consequences of scrappage subsidies. Recent literature has 
evaluated the effectiveness of different policies that aim to control vehicle pollution 
such as taxes on gasoline, miles, or engine size (see, among others, Innes (1996), 
Fullerton and West (2000), and Fullerton and West (2002)), corporate average fuel 
economy (CAFE) standards (see, among others, Goldberg (1998)), and scrappage 
subsidies (Hahn (1995), Baltas and Xepapadeas (1999), Alberini, Harrington, and 
McConnell (1995), Alberini, Harrington, and McConnell (1996)). 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we derive the optimal production 
rule for the monopolist and characterize the effects of a subsidy on the primary 
and secondary markets. In Section 3 we derive the welfare-maximizing subsidy. 
In Section 4 we show how our key result is robust to the addition of imperfect 
competition, multiple vintages, and forward-looking dynamics. We conclude in 
Section 5. 
2 Model 
A quantity-setting monopolist produces homogenous cars at a constant marginal 
cost of c 2:: 0 and competes with a competitive secondary used car market. To 
induce scrappage, a government offers a monetary transfer S 2:: 0 to each consumer 
who scraps a used car instead of selling it in the secondary market or keeping it for 
his own use. After observing S, the monopolist chooses its level of production to 
maximize its profit. We refer to S as a scrappage subsidy, which is in effect a price 
floor in the secondary market. 
Consumers are heterogeneous in theiir willingness to pay for a car and want 
to consume at most one unit of one car. which can be either new or used. The 
heterogeneity amongst consumers is parameterized by e, and e rv U[O, 1] with a 
unit mass. Without loss of generality, we assume that cars are not durable. With 
6The generalized dynamic model predicts that the distribution of vehicle holdings is not mod-
ified in the long run, since the distribution of car ownership slowly converges to the steady state 
values. This prediction contrasts with the implications of a replacement demand model with com-
petitive pricing, constant marginal costs, and no shocks. In such a model, a subsidy modifies the age 
distribution of vehicle holdings permanently. See Section 4 for more explanation. 
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this assumption, the maximization problems of consumers and firm are static.? 
We assume that consumers face no transaction costs in the primary and sec-
ondary markets, and their utility functions are quasi-linear in income. The utility of 
a type-e consumer is given by U = Bq + ye, where q is the quality of the car and 
Ye is his residual income. We assume q = 1 for a new car, q = a E (0, 1) for a used 
car, and q = 0 for the outside option of not buying a car. An implication of verti-
cal differentiation in the quality of the product and heterogeneity in e is that those 
consumers who are willing to pay less for a car allocate to the secondary market. 
Each consumer e determines her optimal consumption choice among the two 
cars available, new and used, and the option of not consuming a car, to maximize 
her utility. Whether a type-e consumer owns a used car or not is immaterial in 
our problem, since the assumptions of quasi-linearity in income and no transaction 
costs imply that each consumer's decision is independent of his income and thus 
of the used car's resale value. Then, a consumer of type e chooses the option that 
gives her utility of 
max{e - PN ,ae - pu ,O} , (1) 
where PN is the price of a new car, pu is the price of a used car, and 0 is the 
normalized price of the outside good. Obviously, pu 2:: S, since S is a price floor in 
the secondary market. 
We let XN denote the production of new cars and xu denote the stock of used 
cars. To differentiate between scrappage and consumption, we denote by su the 
used cars that are scrapped and by cu xu - su those that are consumed and thus 
are transacted in the secondary market. 
A way to classify subsidies is by the amount of scrappage they induce. Given a 
stock of used cars xu, we say that a subsidy is effective if it induces the scrappage 
of used cars. We say that it is minimum, which we denote by Smin(xu ), if it is the 
smallest of the effective subsidies. We say that it is maximum, which we denote by 
Smax (xu), if it is the smallest of the subsidies inducing the scrappage of all used cars. 
Thus, a maximum subsidy is an effective subsidy that closes down the secondary 
market. Obviously, for S 2:: Smax (xu ), su = xu (i.e., cu = 0). For S < Smin(xu ), 
su = 0. The case of partial scrappage, which is su E (O ,xu ), corresponds to SE 
[Smin (xu) , Smax (xu)). 
7 Section 4 shows that the elimination of durability does not engender any loss of generality. The 
intuition is that the subsidy works by modifying the interaction between contemporary primary and 
secondary markets, and does not affect the interaction between these markets and future secondary 
markets. On the other hand, the advantage of modeling the problem as static is that it makes the 
framework tractable and allows us to isolate the effects of the subsidy on prices and output, while 
obtaining the same qualitative results as in a fully dynamic model. 
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To derive the demand functions, we consider the cases of active and inactive 
secondary markets separately. We begin with an active secondary market, which 
requires S < Smax (xu ). Since the secondary market is active, the demand functions 
for new and used cars are characterized by the two consumers, eN and eu, who 
are indifferent between purchasing a new and a used car, and purchasing a used 
car and not purchasing a car, respectively. These are identified by the indifference 
conditions 
(2) 
and 
aeu - pu = 0. (3) 
These indifferent consumers are cut-offs in determining the demand for each car: 
types e 2:: eN consume a new car, types e E [ eu , eN] consume a used car, and types 
e :::; eu do not make any purchase. 8 Therefore, new and used car sales are given by 
XN = 1 - eN and cu = eN - eu, respectively, which implies that the corresponding 
cut-offs are eN = 1 - XN and eu = 1 - XN - cu. Since the secondary market is 
active, cu > 0. 
An active secondary market is consistent with two types of subsidies: subsidies 
that are effective but smaller than the maximum subsidy and subsidies that are not 
effective. For effective subsidies, the price floor in the secondary market binds, 
i.e., pu = S. The amount of scrappage is obtained from the condition aeu = S, 
where eu = 1- XN - cu and cu < xu. Thus, for any e E [1- XN - xu , eu], we have 
ae - s < 0, which implies that type-e prefers the outside option to purchasing 
a used car. In other words, those consumers in the interval [1 - XN - xu , eu] are 
willing to pay less for a used car than its scrappage value, and thus the used cars 
xu - cu are scrapped. Lastly, for ineffective subsidies, the price floor does not bind 
and all used cars are consumed, that is, cu = xu. In this case, the price of a used 
car is simply pu = a (1 - xN - xu). 
More formally, if the secondary marke t is active, we can compactly express the 
inverse demand functions for new and used cars as 
PN = (1- a)(1- XN) + PU (4) 
and 
pu = max{a (1 - xN - xu) ,S}. (5) 
Notice that the condition a ( 1 - XN) - pu > 0 must hold for the secondary market 
to be active. What this condition says is that for (some) types with e < eN to be 
8Sales of new cars are positive if fJN > fJu, which can be expressed as (PN- pu )/( 1-a )> pu j a 
by solving for fJN and fJu in (2) and (3). This inequality is implied by profit maximization, since 
profits are zero otherwise. 
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purchasing used cars, the cut-off consumer eN in (2) must prefer buying a used car 
to the outside option. Otherwise, the neigh boring lower types to eN, who derive 
even less utility from consuming a car, do not purchase a used car either. 
The case of an inactive secondary market requires a sufficiently large subsidy 
so that all used cars are scrapped. That iis, if S 2:: Smax (xu), the demand function 
for new cars is characterized by the single cut-off consumer, eN , who is indifferent 
between purchasing a new car and the outside option. This cut-off type is identified 
by the condition 
(6) 
Since eN = 1 - XN' ( 6) implies 
(7) 
Then, the condition a(1 - XN) - S::::; 0 must hold for the subsidy to close down the 
secondary market. 
We place the following constraint on the parameter values: 
Assumption 1. 1 - a - c > 0. 
This assumption is intuitive and says that type e = 1 (the highest type) derives 
a utility gain from consuming a new car rather than a used one that is more than the 
marginal cost of production. 9 
We can now turn to the problem of the firm. 
2.1 Monopolist's Problem 
The monopolist chooses production to maximize its profit given a subsidy S > 0. 
With its choice of XN, the firm endogenously determines the effectiveness of the 
subsidy since scrappage depends on how a ( 1 - XN - xu), a ( 1 - XN), and S compare. 
Formally, given S and xu , the problem of the monopolist is to choose XN that 
maximizes 
(8) 
9 Another reading of this assumption is that the monopolist's profit is positive when the market is 
covered with used cars. That is, when xu = 1, the price of a used car equals 0 and the consumer with 
highest valuation, fJ = 1, derives a utility gain from consuming a new car rather than a used one that 
equals 1-PN- (a- pu) = 1-PN- a . Therefore, PN ~ 1 - a must hold for some consumers to 
purchase new cars. We then require that choosing PN = 1 - a results in positive profits for the firm, 
which is the condition 1 - a- c > 0. 
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where, by (4), (5), and (7), 
( ( 1 - a ) ( 1 - XN) + a ( 1 - XN - XU) if a ( 1 - XN - XU) ~ S, 
I 
PN(XN,XU ,S) = { (1- a )(1 - XN) + S 
I 
l 1- XN 
if a (1 - xN - xu) :::; Sand 
a (1 - xN) ~ S, 
if a (1- xN):::; S. 
(9) 
The three cases in (9) correspond to three different levels of effectiveness: ineffec-
tive subsidies (no scrappage), effective but less than maximum subsidies (partial 
scrappage), and at least maximum subsidies (full scrappage). 
Before solving this maxirnization problem, it is useful to gauge some intuition 
for how a subsidy affects the workings of car markets. A question we want to ask 
is how large a subsidy should be to be effective. An obvious candidate is for the 
subsidy to equal the price of the used car in the absence of the subsidy (i.e. , to equal 
its without-subsidy price). As we next show, we can offer less than this price and 
still induce scrappage. 
We address this question by considering the empirically relevant case, which 
corresponds to xu such that Smax (xu) > Smin (xu). This inequality says that any 
subsidy between Smin (xu) and Smax (xu) will be effective but will not induce the 
scrappage of all cars. In contrast, if Smax (xu) = Smin (xu), a subsidy will be effective 
only if it induces full scrappage. We also consider Smin(xu) > 0, which says that a 
subsidy is necessary for some used cars to be scrapped (else, the minimum subsidy 
trivially equals zero). As we later show in Proposition 2, restricting to Smax (xu) > 
Smin(xu) > 0 is equivalent to ruling out stocks of used cars that are either too large 
or too small. Finally, in what follows, we use a hat to identify without-subsidy 
prices and production. 
Suppose the lowest effective subsidy equals the without-subsidy used car price, 
which we denote by ftu. Our claim is that the monopolist is strictly better off with 
this subsidy. First, since the subsidy matches the used car price, a feasible choice for 
the firm is to keep the price and profit unchanged by simply producing the without-
subsidy output. That is, PN = (1- a )(1- xN) + S equals PN = (1- a )(1- .XN) + 
a ( 1 - XN - xu) since XN = XN and S = pu. Figure 1 depicts the inverse demand 
functions with and without a subsidy, where the darker line is the inverse demand 
with a subsidy. The two inverse demand functions intersect at XN since prices are 
the same. We can now show that, with the subsidy, the monopolist can do strictly 
better. 
Consider the two price equations for PN and PN. Without the subsidy, the price 
of a new car depends on the supply of new cars through the secondary market, which 
9 
PN 
1 . 
PN = (1 - o)(l - XN ) + o(l - XN - Xu) 
Figure 1: A subsidy equal to fJu 
is given by the term -axN. This implies that increasing the level of production 
lowers the used car price, which feedbacks into the primary market by lowering the 
consumers' willingness to pay for new cars. That is, through the secondary market, 
the firm creates a negative externality on itself. 
Now suppose we offer a subsidy equal to the without-subsidy price. If the sub-
sidy is effective (i.e., the price floor binds), it truncates the dependence of new car 
prices on new car production through the secondary market, which suppresses the 
negative externality that the monopolist creates on itself and makes an increase in 
output profitable for the firm. Graphically, this corresponds to the new car price 
being higher with a subsidy than without one to the right of xN, which is the same 
as the with-subsidy inverse demand function being flatter. Given this incentive to 
raise output, the monopolist chooses 4 in the figure. Then, since the without-
subsidy profit is feasible, standard revealed-preference arguments imply that offer-
ing S = fJu increases the profit of the firm. Thus, the subsidy that makes the firm 
indifferent to not having a subsidy- the minimum subsidy- is less than fJu. 
Proposition 1. Let xu be such that Smax (xu) > Smin (xu) > 0. Then, the minimum 
subsidy is less than the without-subsidy price of a used car: Smin(xu ) < fJu. 
We next solve the monopolist's maximization problem in (8). Notice that the 
monopolist does not face any competition from the secondary market if xu = 0. In 
this case, the monopolist's maximization problem is the standard monopoly prob-
lem. Since the secondary market jeopardizes the profit of the firm, the profit earned 
when xu = 0 constitutes an upper bound on the attainable profit. We call this case 
the standard monopoly problem and identify it with the superscript M. It is imme-
diate to verify that 4f = 12c since PN = 1 - XN. 
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In the next proposition, we use the superscripts N, P, and F to denote the cases 
of no scrappage, partial scrappage, and full scrappage, respectively. 
Proposition 2. Given xu and S, the production rule that solves the monopolist's 
problem in (8) is given by: 
( 1-c a 2 - 2 xu ( x~(xu)) ifS 5: Smin(xu ), 
I 1-a-c+S ( x~(S)) if SE [Smin(xu) ,Smax(xu)] and 
XN = { 
2(1-a) Smax (xu) > Smin (xu) , (10) 
1 - ~ ( x~(S)) ifS E [Smax(xu) ,SM], I a 
I 
l 1-c ( x';J) ifS?.SM, --y-
where 
Smin(xu) 
{ 
1+c . /( 1-c)2 ( 1-c a )2 if a 2 - ay 2 - 2 - 2 xu zxu<&; , 
Jt=(X(1 - c - a xu) - (1 - a - c) ifxu E [&; ,.Xu], 
0 ifxu?. xu , 
(11) 
Smax(xu) 
{ a1-a+c if xu ?. :!.u , 2-a (12) 
Smin(xu) ifxu < :!.u , 
SM 
1+c 
(13) a - 2- , 
1 - c 1- a - c + a 1-a+c 
:!.u ---
2-a (14) 
a a v 1 - a 
and 
xu 
(1 - c)Jt=(X- (1 - a - c) 
(15) 
a v 1 - a 
Proof To solve the monopolist's maximization problem, we proceed in two steps. 
In the first step, we divide the monopolist's maximization in (8) into three con-
strained problems and derive the respective optimal production rules. In the second 
step, we solve the overall problem in (8) by comparing profits in the three subprob-
lems. 
Step 1. Division: Three Constrained Maximization Problems 
We build the three subproblems, denoted (P1)- (P3), by requiring that in each 
subproblem the subsidy be effective at a different (qualitative) level. The three 
11 
1 .. . .. ... ... ... ... .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . 
Pl: a(l - "'N) ~ S {Fiillacta.ppege) 
P2: a(l-"'N _,.u) ~ SI< a(l-«N)2: S 
(Putial ocrappage) 
PI: o(l-"'" -,.u) 2: S 
(No scrappage) 
2.1. Three re.e:ions 2.2. Ootimal production bv re.e:ion for S < §P3 
Figure 2: Proof of Step 1 in Proposition 2 
levels correspond to the three cases in the inverse demand function in (9). Each 
level of effectiveness imposes a restriction on the set of feasible levels of output 
from which the firm can choose. Figure 2.1 depicts these sets for a given subsidy S. 
In (P 1), the subsidy is not effective (no scrappage): XN is such that a ( 1 - XN -
xu) ;:::: S. In (P2), the subsidy is effective but not maximum (partial scrappage): 
XN is such that S;:::: a ( l- XN - xu ) and Ss a ( l-xN)· In (P3), the subsidy is at 
least maximum (full scrappage): XN is such that a ( 1 - XN) s S. Together (P 1 )-(P3) 
cover all the feasible choices of production for the firm in (8). Thus, we can solve 
the overall problem by simply comparing profits in (Pl )- (P3). 
In order to facilitate the exposition, Figure 2.2 depicts the optimal production 
mles for (Pl)-(P3) when standard monopoly profits are not attainable for the firm. 
Formally, this figure corresponds to the case of Ss al.¥ _ SP3, which can be ex-
pressed as 12c < 1 - ~ by rearranging terms. Notice that this inequality determines 
the ranking of intersections in the vertical axis of Figure 2.2. The meaning and 
derivation of this inequality will be clear when we solve (P3). 
The problem of the firm in (Pl ) is to c hoose XN that solves 
max (PI) 
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The solution is given by 
I2c - ~xu if xu < fr?, and 
1 - xu - .§. otherwise a , 
(16) 
where the threshold .x~I is obtained from the constraint a (1- ( I2c - ~~I ) - .x~I ) = 
S and is given by 
~I = (1 +c - 2S) _1_. 
a 2 - a 
(17) 
This production rule says that if the constraint determining the effectiveness of the 
subsidy does not bind, the optimal level of output depends negatively on the stock of 
used cars, which follows from new and ll!sed cars being substitutes for consumers. 
Otherwise, production is given by XN = 1 - xu - ~ · 
Remark 1. The following observations will be useful: (i) when xu :::; ~I , the 
choice of production in (16) equals x~ (xu) in the proposition, which corresponds to 
the case of no scrappage; (ii) the substitutability between new and used cars implies 
that profits in (P1) are decreasing in xu; and (iii) if xu = 0, the monopolist attains 
standard profits in (P1). Since standard profits are an upper bound on the profit of 
the firm, we can establish that the solutions to (P1) and the overall problem coincide 
if xu = 0. 
We turn next to the case of partial scrappage. The problem of the firm in (P2) is 
to choose XN that solves 
max 
XN 
( ( 1 - a) ( 1 - XN) + S - C )XN , 
s.t. a (1- xN - xu):::; Sand a (1- xN) 2:: S. 
The solution is given by 
{ 
~ - xu - ~ 
-W = .w 
1 - .§_ 
a 
if xu :::;.xfl , 
if xu > .xn and s < a (I-a+ c) sn - u - 2-a ' 
ifs 2:: sn , 
where 
.xfr2 _ 1- a - c + S 
N - 2(1- a ) · 
(P2) 
(18) 
(19) 
The threshold stock xfl in ( 18) is obtainecll by substituting .xf? in a ( 1 - .W- xfl) = 
S and rearranging terms, which is then given by 
-n xu 
1- a - c + S S 
1 - --
2(1- a ) a · 
(20) 
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The threshold subsidy sn, which separates the cases of partial and full scrappage, 
is obtained from the condition a(1 -x~2) = S, where .x~2 is given by (19).10 This 
production rule says that if the constraints do not bind, production is increasing 
in the subsidy. If the subsidy is large, the full scrappage constraint binds and 
determines production. Instead, if the subsidy is small and so is the stock of used 
cars, the unconstrained choice of production does not induce partial scrappage and 
the level of output is given by the partial scrappage condition. 11 
Remark 2. There are two observations to emphasize: (i) xfl in (19) equals 4(S) 
in the proposition, which is the optimal production with partial scrappage, and (ii) 
sn equals Smax(xu) in the proposition for xu ~ &J· 
Finally, the problem of the firm in (P3) is to choose XN that solves 
The solution is given by 
max 
XN 
s.t. a(1 - xN):::;s. 
x~3 = --y- s 
{ 
l-e ifs > a1+2c sP3, 
1 - a otherwise, 
(P3) 
(21) 
where the threshold subsidy sP3 is obtained from the constraint a(1 - l2c) = S. 
What this production rule says is that, for a sufficiently large subsidy, standard 
profits and output are attainable for the firm, since full scrappage is attainable with-
out modifying its level of output. Otherwise, for smaller subsidies, production is 
given by the constraint imposing full scrappage. 
Remark 3. Two observations are important: (i) SP3 in (21) equals SM in the propo-
sition, which is the threshold subsidy separating full scrappage without standard 
profits from full scrappage with standard monopoly profits; and (ii), which is di-
rectly implied by (i), for S ~ sP3, production in (P3) equals 41 in the proposition 
and equals .xf;(S) otherwise. 
We now turn to the second step and derive the solution to the (overall) max-
imization problem in (8). The proof works by comparing profits in each of the 
three constrained problems above. Notice that the three problems above identify 
the values for x!j,, 4, x~, and 41 in Proposition 2. ((P3) also identifies SM, and 
(P2) identifies sn, which is one of the subsidies defining Smax (xu) in the proposi-
tion.) It remains for us to compare profits in these three problems. This comparison 
10Note thatx{f < 0 ifS 2: SP2. 
11 Figure 2.2 is drawn by assuming that .xt2 < .xt1, which we prove in Step 2. 
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will identify the threshold values for the subsidies and stocks of used cars in the 
proposition. 
Step 2. Comparison: Solution to (8) 
We first consider S :::; sn, where sn is the threshold separating the cases of 
partial and full scrappage in (P2) and is giiven by (18). 
Remark 4. Assumption 1 implies sn :::; sP3, where SP3, which equals SM in the 
proposition and is given in (2 1), is the threshold subsidy that makes standard monopoly 
profits feasible in (P3).12 
This remark allows us to identify the actual choices of production in (16), (18), 
and (21) for (P1)- (P3) ifS :::; sn, which are given by 
and 
{ 
1-c - g xu 
2 2 s 
1- xu - a 
{ 
1- xu - .§. 
-P2 a 
XN 
( 4 (xu)) if xu < x~1 , 
otherwise, 
if xu :::; xfJ, 
if xu?. xfJ, 
(22) 
(23) 
s x~3 1--. (24) 
a 
A useful observation is that producing XN = 1 - ~ . which is optimal in (P3), is 
feasible in (P2) yet not chosen by the firm. Thus, profits in (P2) are greater than in 
(P3), and it suffices to compare profits in (P1) and (P2). 
In making this comparison, we conjecture the following production rule: there 
exists a threshold stock in the stock of used cars 
1 - c 1 - a - c +S 
iu = -----a-- aJ 1 _ a , (25) 
such that the solution to (8) is given by 
{ 
4(xu) 
XN = 4(S) 
if xu :::; iu , and 
otherwise. 
(26) 
First, we verify that iu in (25) equates profits in (P1) and (P2) when we use these 
conjectured production rules. To see this, we equate profits in both problems and 
obtain 
((1 - a )(1 - 4) + a (1 - 4 - xu) - c)4 = (( 1 - a )(1 - 4) + S - c)4. (27) 
12To see this compute SP2 - s P3 = a l - a +c -a i+c = - a 2(1-c) which is non-positive by As-
, 2-a 2 2(2- a ) ' 
sumption 1. 
15 
Next, we use the first-order condition to each problem to substitute the terms in 
parenthesis and derive 
(28) 
Then, by substituting 4 and x~ for their respective expressions in (10), we get 
1 - c a 1 - a - c+S 
( )2 ( )2 - 2- - 2 xu = ( 1 - a ) 2( 1 - a ) ' (29) 
which, after rearranging terms and solving for xu, yields the threshold xu in (25). 
Second, to prove that this production rule indeed solves (8), we proceed in two 
additional steps: 
1. We conjectured that the production choices used when equating profits in 
(P1) and (P2) were 4 and 4, respectively. To verify this conjecture, we must 
prove that xu E [.xf{ , .x~1 ] so that the choices of production are optimal in (P1) and 
(P2), where xfl and ~1 are given by (20) and (17), respectively. To show that 
xu 2:: xf{, we compute the difference xu - xf{ and simplify terms, to obtain 
_ -n 1 - c 1 - a - c + S ( 1 - a - c + S S) 
xu - xu ----a-- a v 1 - a 1 - 2(1 - a ) - a (30) 
= (1 - c - a+ S) (~ - av : - a + 2(1 ~a) ) (31) 
= 1 - c - a + S (2 _ a _ 2Jr=a) . 
2a (1 - a ) 
(32) 
The quotient in (32) is positive by Assumption 1 and the term in parenthesis is 
increasing in a . It then suffices to show that, when a = 0, the term in parenthe-
sis is non-negative, which is immediate. To show that x~1 2:: xu, we compute the 
difference x~1 - xu and simplify terms to obtain 
-PI -xu - xu ( 1
+c - 2S) _ 1 __ (1 - c _ 1 - a - c+ S) 
a 2 - a a a j 1- a 
2 - a - 2Jf={X (l S) - a - c+ 
av 1- a (2 - a ) ' 
(33) 
(34) 
where the last equality is obtained by rearranging and simplifying terms. Since 
1 - a - c > 0 and 2 - a > 2Jf=(X, we obtain the desired result. 
2. We now show that the profit functions in (P1) and (P2) only intersect once, 
which implies that xu in (25) is uniquely defined. To see this, notice that, as shown 
in Remark 1(i), the profit in (P1) is decreasing in xu. Instead, the profit in (P2) is 
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constant for any xu 2:: xfl, since the price floor binds, while for xu ::::; xfl, output is 
determined by the constraint, and thus the profit is increasing in xu. Together, these 
properties imply that the profit functions can only intersect once. 
Remark 5. Given a subsidy S::::; sn, the threshold xu in (25) identifies the criti-
cal stock of used cars separating the cases of no scrappage and partial scrappage. 
Equivalently, this expression can be rearranged to identify its counterpart, which is 
the critical subsidy separating the cases of no scrappage and partial scrappage for a 
given stock xu. We can label this subsidy S and obtain it by solving for S in (29), 
which implies 
S = vr=<X ( 1 - c - axu) - ( 1 - a - c). (35) 
The subsidy S equals Smin (xu) in the proposition for the case of xu E [&~ ,xu ]. The 
meaning of this interval will be clear as we proceed. 
Remark 6. The threshold S can be negative. If this is the case, profits in (P2) are 
greater than in (P1) for any S 2:: 0. To put it differently, ifS is negative, a subsidy is 
not necessary to induce positive scrappage, since the secondary market is in excess 
supply although a subsidy is not being offered (that is, the non-negativity constraint 
on used car prices binds). This implies Smin(xu) = 0. To see when this might be the 
case, we equate S in (35) to zero and solve for xu, which yields 
_ (1- c)v'1- a - (1 - a - c) 
xu = . 
av' l - a 
(36) 
Thus, as seen in the proposition, for xu > xu, Smin (xu) = 0. 
Lastly, we began Step 2 with the restriction S ::::; sn, yet the proposition, see 
(11) and (12), is stated in terms of the threshold stock &/· To see how one is 
the counterpart of the other, note that, when s ::::; sn' production equals 4 (xu) if 
S::::; S, and equalsx~(S) ifS 2:: S. This implies the following transitions for the level 
of effectiveness of the subsidy: if s ::::; sn' scrappage moves from not inducing 
any scrappage to inducing partial scrappage at S, which implies that x~(S) is the 
optimal production at sn. (It remains for us to derive what is chosen forS > sn.) 
Another way to write this production rule is to say that ifs ::::; sn, Smin(Xu) = S. 
Otherwise, ifS > sn, producing x!/.,(xu) is optimal for all S::::; sn, which implies 
Smin (xu) tj. [0, sn]. However, it remains for us to derive what the minimum subsidy 
equals to. All we know is that, if it exists, it falls in the region S > sn. 
We can now establish the link with&/· The condition comparing Sand sn can 
also be expressed in terms of the threshold stock&!· To obtain this threshold, we 
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equate the two subsidies sand sn, given by (35) and (18), and obtain 
l - a +c v't=<X ( 1 - c - a xu) - ( 1 - a - c) = a . 
Then, we solve for xu and derive 
1 - c l - a - c+al- a+c 2-a &; = --- ----===-=--=--
a a j l - a 
2 - a 
which is the threshold identified in the proposition. Therefore: 
(37) 
(38) 
Remark 7. As stated in the proposition, if xu :::; &; , which is the counterpart of 
S > sn, the firm maximizes profits by choosing 4 (xu) for all S :::; sn. On the 
other hand, if xu 2:: ,!.u, the firm maximizes profits by producing 4 for all S :::; S, 
while the firm chooses 4 forS E [s ,sn ]. 
It remains for us to derive the optimal production rule for s 2:: sn' which we 
relegate to the appendix. D 
Figure 3 depicts the production of new cars and the consumption of used cars 
(which is obtained from S = a ( 1 - cu - XN)) as a function of S. The dashed line 
represents production and the solid line represents used car consumption (i.e., the 
volume of transactions in the secondary market). The case shown corresponds to 
Smax (xu) > Smin (xu) > 0. 
2.2 Effects on Primary and Secondary Markets 
We are now ready to characterize the effects of a subsidy on the automobile market. 
We establish results relative to the case without a subsidy. Following our previous 
notation, PN, pu, and XN denote without-subsidy prices and production. 
Proposition 3. Consider xu such that Smax (xu) > Smin (xu) > 0, which is equiva-
lent to assuming xu E [&; ,xu ]. Then,for any S E [Smin (xu) , Smax (xu) ], the following 
statements hold: 
(i) Sales in the primary market increase: 4(S) > XN. 
(ii) IfS:::; pu, the price of a new car decreases: PN < PN· 
(iii) The price difference between new and used cars decreases: PN - S < PN -
pu. 
( iv) Sales in the secondary market decrease: cu < xu. 
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Figure 3: Production of new cars (dashed line) and transactions in the secondary 
market (solid line) as a function of the subsidy. The case shown corresponds to xu 
such that Smax (xu) > Smin (xu ) > 0, which is the same as xu E [!u ,xu] 
( v) The total number of cars in use increases ifS < flu and decreases ifS 2: flu : 
xK,(S) + cu > XN + xu and x~(S) + cu < XN +xu, respecavely. 
Proof To show (i), it suffices to note that 4 (S) is increasing in Sand 4(Smm) > 
12c - 1xu =XN. To prove (ii), SS flu and (i) imply PN = (1 - a) ( l - 4(S)) +S < 
fiN· To prove (iii), note that PN - S = (1 - a)( l -x~(S)) < (1 - a)(l -xN) = 
flN -flu, where the inequality is implied by (i). To prove (iv), since a subsidy 
S 2: Smin (xu) induces scrappage, cu < xu. To show (v), note that the total of cars in 
use can be obtained from the used car price equationS= a (l - 4 (S) - cu ), which 
impliesx~(S) +cu = 1-Sf a. IfS= flu , then xK,(S) +cu = 1-a(l -xN -xu )fa , 
and this implies xK,(S) +cu =xN+xu. By the same argument,xK, (S) + cu > XN +xu 
ifS < Pu, and x~ ( S) + cu < XN + xu otherwise. D 
If xu is such that Smin (xu ) = 0 (or, what is the same, xu > :Xu ), then, for any 
S E (Smin(xu ), Smax (xu )], items (i), (iii), (iv), and (v) in Proposition 3 apply. That is, 
the primary market expands, the price difference decreases, sales in the secondary 
market decrease, and the fleet of cars decreases. 
This proposition has implications for the choices of consumers. Figure 4 depicts 
their choices for the case of Smax (xu ) > Smin (xu) > 0, and compares them to the 
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case without a subsidy, which is S = 0. Notice that the consumer types are ordered 
from 1 to 0. IfS < Pu, the price of a used car is lower with a subsidy and the 
size of the primary market expands. Thus, as shown in the top line of Figure 4, 
some consumers switch from buying a used car to buying a new one and some 
others switch from not buying a car to buying a used one. An implication is that all 
consumers are better off with the subsidy, since all prices decrease. 13 
x~ (S) cu 
S<fJu ----:---------------- .... . .. ...... .. ... . . 
XN xu 
S=O 
: 1 x~(S) cu 
S>fJu __________ ,...__ ...... , , .... ... .. ... . .. .. ... .. . . . 
Figure 4: Consumption choices for consumers with and without a subsidy when 
Smax > Smin > 0 
Instead, ifS > Pu, used car sales decrease while new car sales increase. That is, 
as shown in the bottom line of Figure 4, some consumers switch from purchasing 
a used car to purchasing a new one, and some switch from purchasing a used car to 
not purchasing any car. It is clear then that those consumers who keep buying a used 
car or switch to not purchasing are made worse off with the subsidy, since either 
they pay more for their car or they derive zero surplus. For those consumers who 
buy a new car, the effects are ambiguous. A sufficiently large subsidy can result in 
a higher price for new cars, which will make these buyers worse off. However, for 
all other subsidies, the price of a new car decreases. To see this, supposeS= pu. 
Since production expands with the subsidy, it is still the case that the price of a new 
car PN = ( 1 - a) ( 1 -xN) +S is (strictly) less than the price of a new car without a 
subsidy, which is fJN = (1 - a)( l -iN) + ftu. Thus, if the surplus of the consumers 
who buy a new car decreases, it will be for a subsidy S » ftu. If this is the case, 
then all consumers will be made worse off with the subsidy. 
Corollary 1. For all S ~ fJu, the subsidy makes all consumers better off. ForS > 
pu, the subsidy makes those consumers who buy a used car or switch to not buying 
a car worse off. 
13Here we do not consider the income effect for those consumers who own a used car and now 
obtainS< fJu. See the next section for results accounting for this effect. 
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3 Welfare Effects 
The next proposition shows that aggregate welfare is maximized at the minimum 
subsidy. We prove this statement in two parts. We first show that if a subsidy is 
effective, aggregate welfare is decreasing in the subsidy. An implication is that 
the (effective) subsidy that yields most welfare is the minimum subsidy. We then 
show that the minimum subsidy yields more welfare than not offering any subsidy. 
The union of these two statements implies that the minimum subsidy maximizes 
aggregate welfare. 
Proposition 4. Consider xu E [&J ,.Xu], where ~u and xu are defined as in Propo-
sition 2 and correspond to Smax (xu) > Smin (xu) > 0. Then, 
1. Aggregate welfare is decreasing in the amount of the subsidy. 
2. Aggregate welfare is greater with a minimum subsidy than without a subsidy. 
Proof 
1. IfS < Smax (xu ), aggregate welfare is given by: 
where the first two terms are the total surplus for those consumers purchasing new 
and used cars, the third term is the resale value of used cars (the revenue for their 
owners), the fourth term is the profit of the firm, and the last term is the total cost 
of the subsidy. By simplifying terms and computing the integrals, we can express 
(39) as 
w (S) = fLxN (jd (j + J/~::-cu a ed e - CXN 
= i (1- (1- xNf) +~ ((1 - xNf - (1 - XN - cuf) - CXN (40) 
= XN ( 1 - C - xf) +a ( 1 - XN - cf) CU . 
To compute W' (S), we must calculate aaf and aaf. If the subsidy is not maximum, 
the effect of Son output is given by a;; = 2( 1 ~a). Similarly, the effect of S on used 
car consumption is obtained from the condition cu = 1 - x~ - ~.which implies 
acu _ 1 1 Th as - - 2(1-a) - a· en, 
W'(S) = (1 - c - 4 - a cu) 
1 
+ a (1- 4 - cu) ( -
1 
_ _!_) 
2(1 - a ) 2(1- a ) a ' 
(41) 
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which simplifies into 
t ) 1 p ) C W (S = - 2(1 - xN - cu - 2(1 - a ). (42) 
Since a ( 1 - 4 - cu) = S > 0 by (3), we obtain the desired result. 
If S E [Smax(xu) ,SM], all used cars are scrapped, cu = 0, and the welfare ex-
pression in ( 40) simplifies into 
W(S) =4 (1-c-x; ). (43) 
N th F - 1 s h. h . 1. ax~ - I Th ote at rN - - a' w tc tmp tes as --a· us, 
W'(S) .J; JxF; (1-c- N) -
dS 
(44) 
(1 - c - (1 - ~)) (- ~) (45) 
.§_ - c 
a (46) - (X , 
which is tr ivially negative. Notice that, since production is continuous at Smax (xu), 
the welfare function has a kink but is continuous. Finally, for S 2:: SM, production 
is independent of S and so is welfare. Again, production is continuous, and thus 
welfare does not increase. 
2. We now show that a minimum subsidy yields more welfare than not offering 
a subsidy. To do so, we use (40) evaluated at partial scrappage, which corresponds 
to 
11 11-~ W(S) = BdB + aBd B - c4. 1 -x~ 1-~-cu (47) 
Since XN < 4 and XN + xu < 4 + cu at the minimum subsidy, the gain in welfare 
from offering a minimum subsidy is 
W(Smin(xu)) - W(O) = e -XN (e - ae )dO+ e-XN-XU (e - ae)dO- c({ - xN). J1-x~ J1-x~-cu 
The first two integrals are positive, and the first term equals 
rl -iN (1- a )()d() , 
J1 -x~ 
(48) 
(49) 
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which can be written as (1- a)(x~ - xN) (1 - (xN +4)/ 2) after integrating terms. 
Since XN < x~ , we get (1- (xN +4)/ 2 ) > 1 - 4, and thus the first integral is 
greater than (1- a)(x~ - xN)( t - 4). Since the second term in (48) is positive, 
we can show that W(Smin(xu )) - W(O) > 0 if we show that (1- a )( l - 4)(4 -
XN) - c(4 - XN) is positive. To do this, we rearrange terms in this equation and 
substitute4 to get ((1- a)( l -x~) - c)(4 - xN) = ((1- a - c - S)/2)(x~ - xN ). 
Then, by evaluating Sat Smin' we have (( 1 - a - c - S) /2)(x~ - xN) = (1- a - c -
1.JT=a( l - c - axu ))(4 - xN ), where the second term in brackets is positive and 
the first term is increasing in xu. Thus, it suffices for us to show that this expression 
is positive when evaluated at xu = 0, which is 
p A 2 - .JT={X p A 
((1- a - c - S) j 2)(xN - XN) = 
2 
(1- a - c)(xN - XN) . (50) 
This expression is positive by Assumption 1 and x~ > XN. D 
Corollary 2. If Smin (xu) = 0 (i.e., xu ~ xu ), S = 0 maximizes welfare. 
Proof Since Smin (xu) = 0, any subsidy S ~ 0 is effective. Then, by (i) in Proposi-
tion 4, the welfare-maximizing subsidy is S = 0. D 
An implication of the previous proposition is that the increase in the profit of the 
firm can be less than the cost of the subsidy itself. In particular, this statement holds 
trivially if the subsidy is minimum: the minimum subsidy does not increase profits 
for the firm, but the cost of financing it is positive since used cars are scrapped. 
4 Robustness 
To complete our analysis, this section explores the generality of our main result, 
established in Proposition 1, by considering three extensions to our model. In each 
extension, we show that the argument establishing Smin < ftu remains valid. 
Generalization 1: Imperfect Competition 
Consider n < oo identical firms choosing quantities simultaneously. Since the prod-
uct is homogenous, the demand function for new cars is still given by (4), with the 
difference that now XN is aggregate output, which is given by XN = Ef=1 x~. Thus, 
the problem of firm i E { 1, . . . , n} is to choose production x~ that solves 
max(pN - c)x~ , 
x' N 
(51) 
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where PN is given by (4). 
Without a subsidy, PN = (1- a )( l - xN) + a (1- xN - xu ), and the solution to 
(51) is x~ = (1- c - axu - L#i.X~)/2. Now, supposeS equals pu, where pu = 
a ( 1 - n.X~ - xu), since all firms are identical. Then, firm i can achieve the same 
profit level as it did without a subsidy by simply producing x~. However, now 
the firm can do better. Since it no longer internalizes the negative effect of its 
own production on new car prices through the secondary market, given by the term 
-ax~ , the firm wants to expand its production. Since the without-subsidy profit 
remains feasible, a revealed-preference argument implies that S = pu increases the 
profit of the firm. Therefore, Smin < pu. Then, Figure 1 and Proposition 1 apply as 
well. 
Generalization 2: Vintages 
Consider now a monopolist choosing new car production while competing with a 
secondary market in which one, two, up to J period old cars are transacted. Since 
cars may depreciate with time, we let a j denote the quality of a car that is j-periods 
old for j = 0, 1, ... ,1. As before, let ao( aN) 1. Then, the quality of used cars 
can be ranked by their vintage with ao = 1 ~ a 1 ~ ... ~ aJ, where the inequalities 
indicate weak depreciation. 
The derivation of the demand function for each car vintage is straightforward. 
Let Bj denote the consumer type who is indifferent between consuming car j and 
j - 1 and is identified from the indifference condition a j Bj - Pj = a j-1Bj - Pj-1· 
Then, by rearranging terms in this indifference condition, we obtain p j = (a j -
a j-1) e j + p j-1. That is, the price of a car of vintage j equals the price of its neigh-
boring lower-quality car plus the gain in utility that the consumer who is indifferent 
between consuming j and j - 1 derives from choosing car j. Therefore, sales of 
vintage j cars, which are Xj, equal Bj + l - Bj. Since this holds for all vintages, 
Bj = 1- E{=0 xi. Then, by substituting these indifferent consumers into the inverse 
demand function for car j, we can express the inverse demand function for vintage 
j as 
j 
Pj = (a j - a j-1)(1 - [ xi)+ Pj-1· (52) 
i=O 
Then, by substituting recursively all the price equations in (52) for all vintages j, 
we obtain that the inverse demand function for new cars is given by 
J j 
Po = [. (a j - aj-1)(1- [ xi)· (53) 
j=O i=O 
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Now, suppose that the subsidy aims to induce the scrappage of used cars of 
vintage hand offers an amount equal to the without-~ubsidy price of an h-th vintage 
car. Thus, S = Ph and po = EJ=0 (a j - a j-1)(1- 'L{=0xj) + S. It is then immediate 
that the lowest subsidy that induces the scrappage of the h-th vintage cars is less 
than S. With S equal to Ph, the monopolist can attain the same profit by producing 
.Xo. Nevertheless, the monopolist can do better. Since the subsidy eliminates the 
negative externality of production through the h-th and older vintage secondary 
markets, the monopolist wants to expand production and Figure 1 and Proposition 
1 apply as well. 
Generalization 3: Forward-looking dynamics 
Consider an infinitely-lived monopolist choosing production in every period, t = 
1, . .. , oo. 14 The monopolist is time consistent and consumers have perfect foresight. 
We let 8 E [0, 1] denote the discount factor, and XN,t and xu,r denote the production 
of new cars and the stock of used cars in period t. Then, the law-of-motion for the 
stock of used cars is given by xu,r = XN,t- t. which is to say that cars fully depreciate 
after two periods of use. 15 
With durability, the cut-off consumers who are indifferent between purchasing 
a new car and a used one, and purchasing a used car and not purchasing any car are 
identified by the two indifference conditio ns 
eNr - Pur , , (54) 
and 
Bu ,r - Pu,r = 0, (55) 
where PN,t - 8 PU,t+1 is the implicit rental price of a new car at date t. (The as-
sumptions that consumers' preferences are quasi-linear in income and there are no 
transaction costs in the primary or secondary markets imply that the implicit rental 
price is the relevant one.) Then, the inverse demand function for new and used cars 
are, respectively, PN,t = (1- a )(1 - xN,r) + pu,r +8pu,r+ 1, and pu,r = a (1 - xN,t -
xu r), wherexu r = XN t-1· The subsidy is effective if a (1 - XN r - xu r) < S. , ' ) ' ) -
In defin ing the dynamic maximization problem of the firm, production may 
depend on the entire history. A natural assumption is to restrict production choices 
to depend only on the past production tha t still transacts in the secondary market. 
This corresponds to the standard Markov assumption, which allows the choices 
14See Esteban (2003) for the complete derivation and characterization of the equilibrium dynam-
ics with imperfect competition, yet without a subsidy. 
15Partial depreciation can be accommodated with a minor modification. 
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of the firm to depend only on the payoff-relevant variables. Given the assumed 
depreciation schedule, these correspond to XN,t-l· Then, the problem of the time-
consistent monopolist can be written as the dynamic-programming problem 
V (xu) = max ( ( 1 - a ) ( 1 - XN) + a ( 1 - XN - XU) + 8 ( 1 - g(XN) - XN) - C) XN 
XN 
+ 8V (xN) , 
(56) 
where V ( ·) is the value function and g( ·) is the equilibrium decision rule. 
It is easy to see that, if the equilibrium decision rule in (56) is linear in xu and the 
value function is quadratic, the maximization problem of the monopolist is linear-
quadratic in the control and stock. Thus, the choice of production solving (56) is 
a linear function XN = g(xu) = ao + a1xu, where ao and a 1 are its coefficients. 16 
Since ao equals the optimal production if the stock is zero, we have ao > 0. Since 
new and used cars are substitutes in consumption, we have a1 < 0. (We can also 
show that a 1 > - 1, which says that production slowly converges back to its steady 
state level once the subsidy is discontinued.17 This implies that, although a subsidy 
changes the distribution of vehicle holdings, its effects are transitory.) 
Now, consider a one-time unanticipated scrappage subsidy. Suppose that the 
subsidy equals fJu, which is the without-subsidy price. As before, the firm can 
achieve the same profit level as it did without a subsidy by choosing XN, which 
solves (56) and has new car price PN = (1- a)(1 - xN) + S + 8a(1 - xN - (ao + 
a1xN) ).18 That is, with XN, prices are the same in all markets and the profit of the 
firm remains unchanged. However, the firm can do better by expanding production 
16The expressions for ao and a1 can be obtained by computing the first-order condition to the 
firm's dynamic programming problem in (56), which is 
(1- a )(1-2xN) + a (l-2xN - xu) +<5 a (1- ao -2a,xN -2xN)- c+<5V'(xN) = 0, (57) 
where, by the envelope theorem, 
(58) 
Solving for XN in these expressions, we obtain 
l+a<5-c-2a<5~ a 
XN = 2 + 2a<5 + 3a<5a1 - 2 + 2a<5 + 3a<5a1 xu . 
(59) 
17For a full derivation, see Esteban (2003). 
18The quantitative benefit of expanding production might be limited in a dynamic model since 
the used car market in t + 1 can be driven into excess supply. That is, the inverse demand function 
for new cars is given by PN = (1- a )(1-iN) +S+<5max{a (1-iN- (ao+ aliN)),O}, where the 
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since it no longer internalizes the negative effect of production on new car prices 
via the secondary market, which is given by the term - axN,t· Then, the feasibil-
ity of the without-subsidy profit level completes the argument and Figure 1 and 
Proposition 1 also apply. 
5 Conclusion 
We have shown that market power has non-trivial effects on determining the effec-
tiveness of a scrappage subsidy and its resulting implications on car markets. One 
key result shows that a subsidy can induoe scrappage even if it pays less for a used 
car than its without-subsidy price. This result is robust to a number of generaliza-
tions. We also show that the smallest subsidy that is effective in inducing scrappage 
is also the one that maximizes welfare. Our results contrast with the predictions 
derived from a model with perfect competition. 
There are relevant extensions to this work. On the one hand, the results can 
be compared to a framework in which subsidies tie the monetary incentive to the 
replacement vehicle being new. On the other hand, they can be compared to other 
forms of regulation that also aim at controlling emissions such as different taxation 
schemes for new and used automobiles. 
max operator is the price of a used car in t + 1, which must be non-negative. The non-negativity of 
prices imposes a bound on the benefits of expanding production if its choice of production makes 
the non-negativity constraint on t + 1 's used car prices bind. Nonetheless, the incentive to expand 
production persists. 
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A Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
What follows completes the proof of Proposition 2 by considering S ~ sn. As 
previously shown, sn is a cutoff in determining when partial scrappage is feasible 
in (P2). 
In the main proof, we showed that sn :::; sM, where s M equals sP3, which is the 
threshold subsidy determining whether standard monopoly profits are feasible for 
the firm. Thus, ifS ~ SM, it is straightforward to see that (P3) results in higher profit 
than (P1) and (P2), since it achieves standard profits. Therefore, the following is 
immediate. 
Remark 8. For S ~ SM, 41 in the proposition solves the overall maxirnization 
problem of the firm as seen in the proposition. 
Then, what remains is to considerS E [SP2,SM]· Recall first that ifS :::; sn (or 
xu ~ ;!u ), the monopolist's choice of production is given by 4 for S :::; S and 4 
forS E [s,sn]. Thus, S is the threshold subsidy separating the cases of partial 
and no scrappage. A critical observation is that the firm's profit is increasing in the 
amount of the subsidy. Therefore, if 4 is preferred to 4 for s E [S' sP2], the same 
ranking between 4 and x!'/, must be preserved for S E [SP2, SM], which establishes 
the choice between (P1) and (P2). Further, forS E [Sn,sM], the solutions to (P2) 
and (P3) coincide for this range of subsidies, with the firm choosing 4- Then, 4 
is the optimal choice of production in the overall problem ifs :::; sn, which is the 
same as xu ~ ;!u. 
Remark 9. In summary, if xu E f:!u ,xu], production equals 4 forS :::; S, equals 
4 forS E [S,SP2], equals 4 forS E [SP2,SM], and equals 41 otherwise. Thus, 
Smin(xu) = S, Smax(xu) = sn, and Smin(xu) < Smax(xu). It can also be the case 
that xu ~ xu. As previously derived, Smin (xu) = 0 for this case and, as just shown, 
-n 
Smax (xu) = S . 
The proof in the main text also shows that, when xu :::; ;!u or S > sn, production 
equals x~(xu) for all s :::; sn. It remains for us to derive the firm's choice when 
SE [Sn,sM]. For this range of subsidies, the solutions to (P1)- (P3) are given by 
{ 1-c a ifS < sPI xf.l ---xu (60) 2 2 s - ' N 1- xu - a otherwise, 
~ s (61) 1--a' 
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and 
s 
1--. 
a 
(62) 
Notice that the choices in (P2) and (P3) are identical, and thus the profit that the 
firm earns is the same. An important observation is that producing 1 - xu - ~ is 
feasible in (P2), yet the monopolist chooses 1 - ~ . Therefore, the choices of the 
monopolist are either 4 in (P1) or x~3 in (P3), which equals 4 in the proposition. 
We conjecture that there exists a threshold subsidy, which we denote by S, such 
that S E [SP2, SM] and this subsidy equates profits in (P1) and (P3), with production 
given by 12c - ~xu (or 4) and 1 - ~ . respectively, and is obtained from 
((1- a)(1- 4) +a (1- 4 - xu) - c)4 = ( 1- ( 1- !) - c)!· (63) 
To solve for S, we substitute on the left -hand side of the equation the first-order 
condition to (P1), substitute 4 for its expression, and rearrange terms, to derive 
(64) 
Then, by solving for S in the equation above, we obtain 
A 1+c 1- c 1- c a V( )2 ( )2 S = a -
2
-- a -
2
- - -
2
--2 xu , (65) 
which equals Smin(xu) in the proposition for the case of xu :::; &;· 
It remains to be shown that SE [Sn ,SM] for all xu :::; &;· Notice that (65) is 
continuous and decreases in xu. With some simple mathematical computations, we 
can show that S = sn if xu = ,!.u· Further, if xu ---7 0, we get S ---7 SM. Together, 
these statements establish our claim that S E [SP2,SM]. Lastly, we may want to 
gauge some intuition for why S ---7 SM if xu ---7 0. Notice that, if xu ---7 0, the firm 
can achieve standard profits by not inducing any scrappage. Therefore, the only 
way in which a firm will induce scrappage is if the profit accrued by doing so is the 
standard monopoly profit, which corresponds to offering a subsidy S ---7 SM. 
Remark 10. For s ;:::: sn (or xu :::; ,!.u ), production equals X~ for s :::; S, equals 
4 for S E [S,SM], and equals 4J for S > SM. Thus, S = Smin(xu) = Smax(xu) if 
xu < &;.as stated in the proposition. 
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